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Wetlands, Property Rights, and the Due
Process Deficit in Environmental Law
Jonathan H. Adler*

In 2005, Michael and Chantell Sackett purchased a two-thirdsacre lot in Bonner County, Idaho, with the intention of building a
single-family home. Two years later, after obtaining the necessary
local permits, the Sacketts began work, only to be told by the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency that they had violated the Clean
Water Act by laying gravel on the site without a permit. According
to the EPA, the Sacketts’ parcel constituted a wetland subject to
federal regulation as part of ‘‘the waters of the United States.’’ A
November 2007 administrative compliance order (ACO) from the
EPA directed the Sacketts to cease construction and undertake specified restoration efforts.1 Failure to comply, the Sacketts were told,
would expose them to fines of up to $65,000 per day—$32,500 each
for violating the CWA and the EPA’s ACO.2 The Sacketts contested

* Jonathan H. Adler (jha5@case.edu) is the Johan Verheij Memorial Professor of Law
and Director of the Center for Business Law and Regulation at the Case Western
Reserve University School of Law and a Senior Fellow at the Property & Environment
Research Center. The author thanks Audrey Balint for her research assistance.
1
The initial compliance order directed the Sacketts to, among other things, plant
‘‘container stock of native scrub-shrub, broadleaved deciduous wetland plants and . . .
native herbaceous wetland plants’’ throughout the site; plant trees; fence the property;
and monitor the site’s vegetation for three years. See Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits
at 7–8, Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012) (No. 10-1062), 2011 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs
LEXIS 1347. The EPA subsequently amended the order to ‘‘remove all unauthorized
fill material’’ and restore the site to its prior condition. Id. at 7. The order also required
the Sacketts to ‘‘provide and/or obtain access to the Site . . . [and] access to all records
and documentation related to the conditions at the Site . . . to EPA employees and /
or their designated representatives.’’ See Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1371 (2012).
2
By the time this case reached the Supreme Court, the maximum penalty had increased
to $37,500 per violation per day. See Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1370 n.1.
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the EPA’s claim of CWA jurisdiction, but were denied an administrative hearing. So they proceeded to court.3
The federal district court and U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit both turned away the Sacketts’ legal claim.4 Both courts
concluded they lacked jurisdiction to hear the Sacketts’ claim because
an ACO is not subject to judicial review. Although the order carried
with it a threat of substantial fines for failure to comply, both courts
ruled that the Sacketts could not obtain review of the order unless
and until the EPA brought an enforcement action against them in
federal court. As the Ninth Circuit explained, the CWA ‘‘impliedly’’
precluded pre-enforcement review, so the timing and nature of any
judicial review of the EPA’s commands would be up to the EPA.5
In the meantime, the Sacketts’ legal liability would increase each
day they failed to accede to the EPA’s commands.
In March 2012, the Supreme Court sided with the Sacketts.6 In a
unanimous opinion, the Court held that the EPA’s ACO was a final
agency order subject to immediate judicial review. Contrary to the
claims of the federal government, and the conclusions of the lower
courts, nothing in the CWA precluded courts from hearing the Sacketts’ claim. Under the Administrative Procedure Act,7 the ACO qualified as a ‘‘final agency action’’ for which there was ‘‘no adequate
remedy’’ other than judicial review.8
As a consequence of this decision, the Sacketts will get their day
in court, but they will still have to wait before restarting work on
their home. More than four years after receiving the EPA’s order,
all the Sacketts won was ‘‘a modest measure of relief’’—the right
to challenge the EPA’s jurisdictional claim in federal court.9 The
3

For a fuller account of the litigation, see, elsewhere in this volume, Damien M.
Schiff, Sackett v. EPA: Compliance Orders and the Right of Judicial Review, 2011–2012
Cato Sup. Ct. Rev.
(2012); see also Timothy Sandefur, Compliance—Or Else:
The EPA’s Compliance Order Regime Creates a Hobson’s Choice, 34 Regulation 8
(Winter 2011–2012).
4
See Sackett v. EPA, 2008 WL 3286801 (D. Idaho 2008), aff’d 622 F.3d 1139 (9th
Cir. 2010).
5
Sackett, 622 F.3d at 1132.
6
Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012).
7
5 U.S.C. § 500 et seq.
8
9

Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1374.
Id. at 1375 (Alito, J., concurring).
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Supreme Court’s narrow and rather straightforward ruling is important, but it does not get landowners like the Sacketts out of the
swamp. Nor does it do much to alleviate the serious due process
concerns that plague the application and enforcement of federal
wetlands regulation.
The Sacketts were not the first landowners bogged down by federal wetlands regulation, and they will not be the last. Controversy
and confusion have enveloped federal regulation of wetlands for
decades. Under the CWA, federal regulators have asserted authority
over waters and dry lands alike and sought to expand federal jurisdiction well beyond constitutional limits. The resulting regulatory
morass provides landowners with little notice and even less certainty
as to which lands are covered, under what authority, or with what
effect. Unreviewable ACOs are only one source of the due process
deficit plaguing federal wetlands regulation.
Federal Regulation of Wetlands
The scope of federal regulatory authority under the Clean Water
Act has been contested since the law was enacted in 1972, particularly
(though not exclusively) with regard to wetlands. The CWA prohibits the ‘‘discharge of any pollutant,’’ including dredged or fill material, into the ‘‘navigable waters’’ of the United States without a
permit.10 The CWA further defines ‘‘navigable waters’’ as ‘‘waters
of the United States,’’11 and authorizes the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to issue permits ‘‘for the discharge of dredged or fill material’’
into such waters, subject to EPA oversight.12 While the CWA unquestionably asserted authority beyond those waters that were truly
navigable in 1972, there was still some question as to how far federal
jurisdiction would reach. The CWA is ‘‘notoriously unclear’’ as to
the extent to which it projects federal regulatory authority over
private land.13 As the Supreme Court observed in 1985, ‘‘On a purely
linguistic level, it may appear unreasonable to classify ‘lands,’ wet

10

See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (prohibiting the discharge of pollutants); 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6)
(defining ‘‘pollutant’’ to include dredged material, rock, and sand).
11
See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).
12
13

See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a), (c).
Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1375 (Alito, J., concurring).
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or otherwise, as ‘waters.’ ’’14 Yet that is precisely what has happened
under the CWA.
From the outset, the two agencies entrusted with protecting the
nation’s ‘‘waters’’ disagreed on what this meant. The EPA insisted
that ‘‘waters’’ included wetlands, but the Corps was not so sure.
The latter promulgated regulations that did not purport to cover
wetlands and many other intrastate waters.15 Environmental groups
shared the EPA’s perspective and filed suit. In Natural Resources
Defense Council v. Callaway, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia held that Congress ‘‘asserted federal jurisdiction over the
nation’s waters to the maximum extent permissible under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution,’’ which meant that at least some
of the nation’s wetlands were subject to federal control.16
Federal jurisdiction expanded in the wake of the Callaway decision,
but it was still murky. In 1975, the Corps issued interim regulations
slightly expanding the definition of ‘‘waters.’’17 Then, in 1982, the
Corps and the EPA promulgated regulations defining ‘‘waters of
the United States’’ to include all waters used for interstate commerce,
all interstate waters and wetlands, all tributaries or impoundments
of such waters, and ‘‘all other waters’’ and wetlands ‘‘the use, degradation or destruction of which could affect interstate commerce,’’
including those waters and wetlands that could be used for commercial, industrial, or recreational purposes.18 As an estimated threequarters of wetlands are privately owned,19 these regulations represented a dramatic expansion of federal regulatory authority over
private land, as did subsequent agency manuals detailing what
would constitute a ‘‘wetland.’’20 Even with the jurisdictional expansion, there were still questions as to what would constitute a ‘‘water’’
14

United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 132 (1985).
See 33 Fed. Reg. 12,119 (Apr. 3, 1974); see also Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook
County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs., 531 U.S. 159, 168 (2001) (noting that the Corps
originally adopted a narrow interpretation of its jurisdiction under the CWA).
16
See 392 F.Supp. 685, 686 (D.D.C. 1975).
17
40 Fed. Reg. 31,320, 31,324 (July 25, 1975) (33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (1988)).
18
33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a) (emphasis added).
19
See Jon Kusler, Wetlands Delineation: An Issue of Science or Politics?, Env’t, Mar.
1992, at 29.
20
Particularly controversial was the wetland delineation manual released by the EPA
in 1989, which greatly broadened the definition of what could constitute a wetland
and expanded the amount of land covered from an estimated 100 million acres to
200 million acres. See Nancie G. Marzulla, The Property Rights Movement: How It
15
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or ‘‘wetland,’’ and different agencies offered different answers at
different times.21 Were that not enough, the agencies asserted that
nearly any activity undertaken on regulated waters or wetlands
could be subject to federal control, even riding a bike or walking.22
Any de minimis exception was due not to any limit on federal statutory authority, but bureaucratic grace.
Part of the problem for landowners is that a given parcel of land
need not contain water or be particularly wet in order to be considered a ‘‘wetland’’ and thus part of the ‘‘waters of the United States.’’23
A more basic part of the problem is that the regulations promulgated
by the Corps and EPA seem to extend beyond the scope of federal
regulatory authority. The CWA was enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause, which grants Congress the power to ‘‘regulate Commerce . . . among the several states.’’24 As interpreted by the modern
Supreme Court, this clause grants Congress substantial power to
regulate ‘‘economic activity.’’ Yet like all enumerated powers, it is
subject to limits––limits neither the Corps nor the EPA made any
effort to observe.
Early on, landowners challenged the Corps’ regulations, but without much initial success—and without creating much regulatory
certainty. In 1985, for example, the Supreme Court concluded that
CWA regulatory authority extended to ‘‘wetlands adjacent to navigable waters and their tributaries,’’ but the Court said little more
by way of defining the scope of permissible federal regulation.25

Began and Where It Is Headed, in Land Rights: The 1990s’ Property Rights Rebellion,
17 (Bruce Yandle ed., 1995).
21
James Delong notes that between 1986 and 1994 the ‘‘basic definition of wetlands
used by the government changed at least six times.’’ See James V. DeLong, Property
Matters: How Property Rights are Under Assault––And Why You Should Care 134
(1997). See also U.S. General Accounting Office, GAO/RCED-98-150, Wetlands Overview: Problems with Acreage Data Persist (1998) (noting lack of uniform federal
definition of what constitutes a ‘‘wetland’’ for the purpose of various federal
programs).
22
See 58 Fed. Reg. 45,008, 45,020 (Aug. 25, 1993) (asserting authority to regulate
‘‘walking, bicycling, or driving a vehicle through a wetland’’ because such activities
could result in the ‘‘discharge of dredged material.’’).
23
33 U.S.C. § 1362.
24
25

U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
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Around the same time, the EPA and Corps began to assert federal
regulatory jurisdiction even more aggressively, relying on nothing
more than the potential presence of migratory birds.26 Specifically,
in 1986 the Corps issued the so-called migratory bird rule, which
declared that the Corps’ regulatory authority extended to intrastate
waters (including wetlands) that, among other things, ‘‘are or would
be used as habitat’’ by migratory birds.27 This so-called rule was not
even a rule at all, as it was contained in a regulatory preamble and
was issued without following the notice and comment procedures
required by the Administrative Procedure Act.28 The ‘‘rule’’ served
nonetheless as a basis for the agencies’ jurisdictional determinations.
Then, in 1995, in United States v. Lopez, a case having nothing to
do with wetlands, the Supreme Court invalidated the Gun-Free
School Zones Act, holding that in passing it, Congress had exceeded
its authority under the Commerce Clause.29 This decision reaffirmed
that the federal government possesses only enumerated powers subject to judicially enforceable limits.30 Under Lopez, the federal government can use its Commerce Clause authority to regulate the ‘‘channels of interstate commerce’’ and their use, the ‘‘instrumentalities’’
of and persons and things in interstate commerce, and those activities
that ‘‘substantially affect’’ interstate commerce.31 So construed, the
commerce power is broad, but it is not infinite.
Lopez marked the first time the Court had invalidated a federal
law on Commerce Clause grounds in 58 years. Commentators immediately recognized the potential vulnerability of federal wetland

26
See, e.g., Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n. v. Laubscher, 662 F. Supp. 548 (S.D. Tex. 1987) (‘‘a
wetland visited by migratory birds is a wetland within the jurisdiction of the federal
defendants’’); see also Karol J. Ceplo, Land-Rights Conflicts in the Regulation of
Wetlands, in Land Rights: The 1990s’ Property Rights Rebellion, supra note 20, at
114–15.
27
See 51 Fed. Reg. 41,217 (1986).
28
See Solid Waste Agency v. United States Corps of Eng’rs (SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159,
164 n.1 (2001); see also Tabb Lakes v. United States, 715 F.Supp. 726 (E.D. Va. 1988),
aff’d 885 F.2d 866 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that Corps could not assert jurisdiction
based migratory bird rule due to failure to follow notice and comment requirements).
29

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
Id. at 552 (‘‘We start with first principles. The Constitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated powers.’’).
31
See id. at 558–59.
30
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regulations to constitutional challenge.32 Writing in The Environmental Forum, noted environmental law professor Richard Lazarus
warned that the federal wetlands regulations then on the books
were ‘‘clearly out of bounds’’ under Lopez and would need to be
rewritten.33 The commerce power unquestionably reached navigable-in-fact waters, such as major rivers and waterways, as well as
those activities that have a ‘‘substantial effect’’ on interstate commerce. Yet the Corps and EPA sought to regulate far more. In particular, the regulations purported to reach those waters and wetlands
with only a potential effect on commerce, let alone an actual and
‘‘substantial’’ one.34 Further, under the ‘‘migratory bird rule,’’ the
agencies sought to reach isolated waters and wetlands due to nothing
more than their potential use by migratory birds––a theory some
commentators referred to as the ‘‘glancing goose’’ test.35 Whether a
wayward goose glanced longingly at a given parcel of land was a
tenuous reed on which to establish federal jurisdiction.
Despite this and other warnings, the Corps and EPA were content
to stand pat. No reevaluation of their jurisdiction was forthcoming.
Unsurprisingly, litigation ensued. Most federal appellate courts,
however, were not particularly sympathetic to commerce-based
challenges to federal wetland regulations.36 Fortunately for landowners, the Supreme Court saw things differently. In Solid Waste Agency
of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (SWANCC)
the Supreme Court rejected the Corps’ claim of jurisdiction over

32
See, e.g., David A. Linehan, Endangered Regulation: Why the Commerce Clause
May No Longer Be Suitable Habitat for Endangered Species and Wetlands Regulation,
2 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 365 (1998); Lori J. Warner, The Potential Impact of United States
v. Lopez on Environmental Regulation, 7 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol’y F. 321 (1997); see
also Jonathan H. Adler, Wetlands, Waterfowl and the Menace of Mr. Wilson: Commerce Clause Jurisprudence and the Limits of Federal Wetland Regulation, 29 Envtl.
L. 1, 5 (1999).
33
Richard J. Lazarus, Corps Slips on Lopez, FWS Wins, Envtl. F., Mar.–Apr. 1998, at 8.
34
For more on the questionable constitutional validity of federal wetlands regulations
as currently drafted, see Adler, supra note 32 at 30–40.
35
DeLong, supra note 21, at 131–32.
36
See, e.g., Hoffman Homes v. EPA, 999 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v.
Pozsgai, 999 F.2d 719 (3d Cir. 1993); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388
(9th Cir. 1995); Solid Waste Ass’n of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs,
191 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 1999). But see United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 1997).
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several permanent and seasonal ponds due to the occasional presence of migratory birds.37 These waters were neither adjacent to nor
hydrologically connected to navigable waters. As a consequence,
accepting the Corps’ claim of jurisdiction ‘‘invoke[d] the outer limits
of Congress’ power’’ and could not be sustained.38 Citing such federalism concerns, the Court held that the CWA does not confer federal
regulatory jurisdiction over isolated, intrastate waters, and the
Corps’ jurisdictional regulations ‘‘as clarified and applied to petitioner’s balefill site pursuant to the ‘Migratory Bird Rule’ exceeds the
authority granted’’ to the Corps under the CWA.39
The Corps and EPA remained undaunted.40 The agencies briefly
considered revising their jurisdictional regulations to account for
the SWANCC decision, but then had better ideas.41 As Chief Justice
John Roberts would note the next time CWA jurisdiction came before
the Court, instead of ‘‘refining its view of its authority’’ in light of
SWANCC, ‘‘the Corps chose to adhere to its essentially boundless
view of the scope of its power.’’42 With the old regulations still
on the books, and the Corps and EPA continuing to assert broad
regulatory authority, lower courts continued to split over the federal
government’s regulatory reach. Despite the existence of nationally
applicable regulations, there was little uniformity in the application
or enforcement of the relevant rules, and no more certainty as to
the scope of federal regulatory jurisdiction.43

37

531 U.S. 159 (2001).
Id. at 172.
39
Id. at 174. For more on the SWANCC decision, see Jonathan H. Adler, The Ducks Stop
Here? The Environmental Challenge to Federalism, 9 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 205 (2001).
40
See, e.g., Memorandum from Gary S. Guzy, General Counsel, U.S. EPA, & Robert
M. Andersen, Chief Counsel, U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, Supreme Court Ruling
Concerning CWA Jurisdiction over Isolated Waters (Jan. 19, 2001).
41
See Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the Clean Water Act Regulatory
Definition of ‘‘Waters of the United States,’’ 68 Fed. Reg. 1991 (Jan. 15, 2003); Eric
Pianin, EPA Scraps Changes to Clean Water Act: Plans Would Have Reduced Protection, Wash. Post, Dec. 17, 2003, at A20.
38

42

See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S 715, 758 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
See Robert W. Adler, The Law at the Water’s Edge: Limits to ‘‘Ownership’’ of
Aquatic Ecosystems, in Wet Growth: Should Water Law Control Land Use? 201, 228
(Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold ed., 2005) (jurisdictional reach after SWANCC was
‘‘perhaps as uncertain as it has been since the Callaway decision in 1975’’).
43
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In 2006, the Supreme Court again considered and rejected the
Corps and EPA theories of regulatory jurisdiction under the CWA.
In Rapanos v. United States the Court considered the application of
the CWA to properties with tenuous connections to navigable-infact waters.44 One of the parcels in question was over 10 miles from
the nearest navigable waterway.45 The Corps nonetheless claimed
jurisdiction because water from wetlands on the site drained into a
ditch that drained into a creek that, in turn, flowed into a navigable
river.46 For knowingly depositing fill material on his land without
a federal permit, John Rapanos faced criminal prosecution, up to
five years in jail, and hundreds of thousands of dollars in fines.47
In rejecting the bases upon which the Corps asserted jurisdiction
over Rapanos’s parcel, a majority of the Court reaffirmed that federal
regulatory authority is subject to outer limits and that the CWA
should be construed narrowly as a result. Four justices sought to
limit the CWA to those waters and wetlands with a relatively permanent or ‘‘continuous surface connection’’ to navigable waters,48 while
Justice Anthony Kennedy would have required identification of only
a ‘‘significant nexus’’ between a given intrastate water or wetland
and navigable waters.49 In this regard, the Court reaffirmed the
reasoning of SWANCC that ‘‘waters of the United States’’ extend
only to those waters and wetlands that have a ‘‘significant nexus’’
and are ‘‘inseparably bound up with the ‘waters’ of the United
States.’’50

44
Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006). For more on the Rapanos decision
and its effects, see Jonathan H. Adler, Reckoning with Rapanos: Revisiting ‘‘Waters
of the United States’’ and the Limits of Federal Wetland Regulation, 14 Mo. Envtl.
L. & Pol’y Rev. 1 (2006); Jonathan H. Adler, Once More, With Feeling: Reaffirming
the Limits of Clean Water Act Jurisdiction, The Supreme Court and the Clean Water
Act: Five Essays (L Kinvin Wroth ed., 2007), available at http://www.vjel.org/books/
pdf/PUBS10004.pdf.
45
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 720 (Scalia, J., plurality).
46
47
48
49

Id. at 725.
Id. at 721.
Id. at 739–42.
Id. at 759 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).

50
SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 168 (quoting United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474
U.S. 121, 134 (1985)); see also Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 758 (Scalia, J., plurality) (noting
‘‘significant nexus’’ requirement of SWANCC).
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Again the Corps and EPA suffered a defeat, and again they failed
to respond. Even though the Court’s controlling opinion suggested
the issuance of clarifying regulations, and two justices wrote separately to urge the same, the Corps and EPA have continued to rely
on decades-old jurisdictional rules, the application of which has
been twice rejected by the Supreme Court. Instead of clarifying their
regulations, they have issued a series of guidance documents, final
and otherwise, that do little to resolve the underlying confusion
about the extent to which private land use is subject to regulation
under the CWA.51 As Justice Samuel Alito noted in Sackett, ‘‘far from
providing clarity and predictability, the agency’s latest informal
guidance advises property owners that many jurisdictional determinations concerning wetlands can only be made on a case-by-case
basis by EPA field staff.’’52 Indeed, despite SWANCC and Rapanos,
both agencies continue to assert a near-boundless conception of the
scope of their own authority.53
Given this history, it is no wonder that landowners in the Sacketts’
position would be left uncertain whether the Corps and EPA could
claim federal jurisdiction over their land. Wetland characteristics
may be necessary for the CWA to apply to a given plot of land, but
they are not sufficient. A parcel must still have a ‘‘significant nexus’’
to the ‘‘waters of the United States’’ for it to be subject to federal
control. In the absence of clarifying regulations, such determinations

51
See, e.g., U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency & U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, Clean Water Act
Jurisdiction Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s Decision in Rapanos v. United States
and Carabell v. United States (June 5, 2007); U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency & U.S. Army
Corps of Eng’rs, Clean Water Act Jurisdiction Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s
Decision in Rapanos v. United States and Carabell v. United States (Dec. 2, 2008); Draft
Guidance from the EPA and the U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs on Identifying Waters
Protected by the Clean Water Act, (May 2, 2011), http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/
guidance/wetlands/upload/wous;usguidance;us4-2011.pdf.
52
Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1375 (Alito, J., concurring) (citing Brief of Amicus Curiae The
Competitive Enterprise Institute in Support of Petitioners at 7–13, Sackett v. EPA,
132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012) (No. 10-1062), 2011 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1672).
53

See, e.g., Richard E. Glaze, Jr., Rapanos Guidance III: ‘‘Waters’’ Revisited, 42 Envtl.
L. Rep. 10,118, 10,118 (2012) (draft Corps-EPA guidance ‘‘would provide the agencies
a basis for exercising broader authority over the nation’s waters than current policy
supports’’); Diedre G. Duncan & Kerry L. McGrath, EPA and U.S. Army Corps Seek
to Expand Jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act, Engage, Mar. 2012, at 64 (draft
Corps-EPA guidance would ‘‘expand’’ agency jurisdiction under CWA).
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can be made only on a case-by-case basis.54 Given both agencies’
history of overzealous assertions of their own authority, one could
excuse landowners for doubting the jurisdictional claim made by
an agency enforcer—yet acting on such doubts could have serious
legal and financial consequences, as the Sacketts discovered.
Enforcing the Clean Water Act
When faced with an alleged CWA violation, such as the discharge
of fill material onto a jurisdictional wetland without a permit, the
EPA has several enforcement options. First, the agency may initiate
a civil or criminal enforcement action in federal court.55 Second, it
may seek to impose administrative penalties on the alleged violator,
after providing an opportunity for a hearing.56 Of note, if the EPA
pursues either of these first two options, the alleged violator is
guaranteed notice and an opportunity to be heard before any penalties or other serious consequences attach.
The EPA’s third option is to issue an administrative compliance
order (ACO) that sets forth the nature of the alleged CWA violation
and identifies those actions necessary for the alleged violator to
come into compliance.57 Under the CWA, an ACO may be issued
‘‘on the basis of any information available’’ to the EPA administrator.58 There is no hearing or other adjudication before an ACO is
issued, nor may a landowner obtain an agency hearing afterwards.
Although an ACO is not self-executing—the EPA must bring an
enforcement action in federal court to enforce it—failing to comply
with an ACO is itself subject to penalties equal to those imposed
for violating the relevant provisions of the CWA.59 In the Sacketts’
case, they were informed that violating the EPA’s ACO could result
in ‘‘civil penalties of up to $32,500 per day of violation.’’60
54
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 782 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 758
(Roberts, C.J., concurring).
55
See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b).
56
See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g).
57
See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a).
58
See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(3).
59
See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d); see also Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1372 (‘‘according to the
Government’s current litigating position, the order exposes the Sacketts to double
penalties in a future enforcement proceeding.’’).
60
See Sackett, 622 F.3d at 1141. By the time this case reached the Supreme Court,
however, the maximum fine had been increased to $37,500 per day. See supra note 2.
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The EPA maintained that ACOs are not final agency actions
reviewable in federal court unless and until the agency elects to
pursue an enforcement action. Before the Ninth Circuit, and again
in their petition for certiorari, the Sacketts claimed that the CWAACO regime violated their due process rights. Specifically, they
argued that, under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, they
were constitutionally entitled to some form of judicial review of the
ACO. Otherwise, they would be left with a Hobson’s Choice because
the only way to challenge the EPA’s assertion of authority would
be to violate the ACO at risk of substantial penalties—penalties that
derived from violating an ACO, which could, in turn, be based on
a mere scintilla of evidence.61
The Ninth Circuit rejected the Sacketts’ due process argument,
but not without some concern. ‘‘If the CWA is read in the literal
manner the Sacketts suggest, it could indeed create a due process
problem,’’ the court explained.62 As written, the CWA would seem
to provide that the Sacketts could be penalized for violating an ACO
that was issued without a hearing of any sort on the basis of ‘‘any
information available,’’ even if they had not violated the CWA itself.
Such an interpretation would have raised serious constitutional
questions, so the Ninth Circuit announced it would ‘‘decline to
interpret the CWA’’ as written.63 Instead, the court explained, it
would read the CWA to provide that the EPA could bring an enforcement action to enforce an ACO only if the agency also alleged a
violation of the act itself, and that a court could assess civil penalties
for violating an ACO only if ‘‘the EPA also proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendants actually violated the CWA
in the manner alleged.’’64 So construed, the Ninth Circuit concluded,
the CWA’s preclusion of pre-enforcement judicial review of ACOs
did not violate due process.
The Ninth Circuit had acknowledged the Sacketts’ due process
concerns, but still left them in a difficult position. Refusal to comply

61
See Sandefur, supra note 3; Christopher M. Wynn, Facing a Hobson’s Choice?
The Constitutionality of the EPA’s Administrative Compliance Order Enforcement
Scheme under the Clean Air Act, 62 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1879, 1896 (2005).
62
Sackett, 622 F.3d at 1145.
63
64

Id.
Id.
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with the ACO could still bring substantial penalties—penalties that
would continue to accrue unless and until they complied with all
of its terms or the EPA brought a civil action against them. Although
the Sacketts maintained their land was beyond the scope of EPA
jurisdiction, the incentive to settle would be overwhelming for people of ordinary means, as they had few other options. Nonetheless,
the Ninth Circuit concluded that the potential penalties were not
‘‘so onerous as to ‘foreclose all access to the courts’ and ‘create a
constitutionally intolerable choice.’’’65
As the Ninth Circuit saw it, the Sacketts retained the option to
‘‘seek a permit to fill their property and build a house.’’66 A permit
denial, unlike an ACO in its view, would be a final agency action
immediately appealable in court.67 Yet the Army Corps of Engineers
would not accept a permit application from the Sacketts unless and
until they complied with the ACO.68 Moreover, applying for a permit
is no small matter. Obtaining an individual permit from the Corps
can take years and cost tens (if not hundreds) of thousands of dollars.69 Furthermore, to apply for a permit would be to accept the
very claim the Sacketts sought to contest: that their land was subject
to the regulatory jurisdiction of the CWA.70
In their petition for certiorari, the Sacketts focused on the alleged
due process violation.71 Not only had the Ninth Circuit denied them
the opportunity to challenge the EPA’s ACO and the fines for noncompliance with the ACO, but the CWA would continue to accumulate so long as the EPA wished to wait. This scenario, the Sacketts
maintained, presented them with a ‘‘constitutionally intolerable
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Id. at 1146 (quoting Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 218 (1994)).
Id.
67
Id.
66
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Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1372.
See David Sunding & David Zilberman, The Economics of Environmental Regulation by Licensing: An Assessment of Recent Changes to the Wetland Permitting
Process, 42 Nat. Resources. J. 59, 74–76 (2002).
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As the Court also noted, ‘‘The remedy for denial of action that might be sought
from one agency does not ordinarily provide an ‘adequate remedy’ for action already
taken by another agency.’’ Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1372.
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Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012) (No. 10-1062),
2011 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 851; See Schiff, supra note 3, at .
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choice’’ between seeking to vindicate their rights and risking substantial financial liability.72 As the Court had long maintained, due
process of law is violated if the ‘‘practical effect of coercive penalties
for noncompliance’’ is to ‘‘foreclose all access to the courts.’’73 As
the Court had observed in 2010, ‘‘We normally do not require plaintiffs to ‘bet the farm . . . by taking the violative action’ before ‘testing
the validity of the law.’ ’’74
However important the due process questions were, they did not
attract the Court’s attention—at least not enough to engender serious
consideration. In agreeing to hear the case, the Supreme Court
reformulated the questions presented, adding a preliminary question
about whether the CWA actually precluded judicial review as the
EPA maintained and lower courts had held. Specifically, the Court
asked the parties to answer the question, ‘‘May petitioners seek preenforcement judicial review of the administrative compliance order
pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. §704?’’75
That the Court added a preliminary statutory question should not
have been surprising. The Court has gone out of its way to avoid
addressing due process questions arising from regulatory enforcement, denying certiorari in cases raising similar due process claims
under other environmental statutes. The Court’s refusal to hear Tennessee Valley Authority v. Whitman76 had been particularly surprising.
In TVA, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit had held
a similar ACO regime under the Clean Air Act was unconstitutional
because the orders were issued without providing regulated parties
a sufficient opportunity to be heard.77 As the Eleventh Circuit saw
it, ACOs have the force of law, yet could be issued ‘‘on the basis of
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Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7, Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012) (No. 101062), 2011 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 851 (quoting Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich,
510 U.S. 200, 218 (1994)).
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Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 218 (1994) (citing Ex parte Young,
209, U.S. 123, 148 (1908)).
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Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3151 (2010)
(citations omitted).
75

Sackett v. EPA, 131 S. Ct. 3092 (2011) (granting cert.).
Leavitt v. TVA, 541 U.S. 1030 (2004) (denying cert.).
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TVA v. Whitman, 336 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2003).
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any information available’’ (much like ACOs under the CWA).78 The
Court had also turned away efforts by General Electric, to challenge
administrative orders under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (a.k.a. ‘‘Superfund’’).79
If the Court had wished to address the due process question, it had
been given plenty of opportunities.
Although some on the Court may have been concerned about the
due process implications of the CWA regulatory regime,80 the Court
in the end saw no need to reach that far. Rather, a unanimous Court
was able to resolve the case on narrow statutory grounds, relying
on the Administration Procedure Act and well-established administrative law principles—all without expressly considering the Sacketts’ due process concerns. The ACO had all the characteristics of a
‘‘final agency action’’ in that it ‘‘determined’’ the Sacketts’ ‘‘rights
or obligations’’ by exposing the Sacketts to double penalties for
violating the CWA and imposing upon them an obligation to restore
the site in accordance with the EPA’s commands.81 Further, the ACO
marked the ‘‘consummation’’ of the EPA’s decisionmaking. This
factor was enough to establish that the ACO could be subject to
judicial review. Contrary to the reading of the Ninth Circuit, nothing
in the CWA expressly precluded a suit challenging the ACO, and
the Court was not going to read such a limit into the CWA’s text.
The APA embodies a presumption of reviewability, and this presumption was enough to overcome statutory silence on the preclusion of review.
But what if the CWA had not been silent on the question? What
if the CWA had expressly precluded pre-enforcement review of
ACOs? This is not an idle question. Other environmental statutes
expressly preclude judicial review of compliance orders, and some
commentators have urged Congress to amend the CWA so as to
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Id. at 1258. Because the Court concluded that it would be unconstitutional for ACOs
to have the force of law, it concluded an ACO should not be considered final agency
action, and should be treated as legally inconsequential. Id. at 1260.
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See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Jackson, 610 F.3d 110 (D.C. Cir., 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
2959 (2011).
80
See, e.g., Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1375 (Alito, J., concurring).
81
Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1372–72 (quoting Bennet v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 178 (1997))
(citation omitted).
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make ACOs unreviewable here as well.82 The aforementioned federal
Superfund statute, for example, bars federal courts from hearing
challenges to ‘‘unilateral administrative orders’’ (UAOs), which are
used to force companies to undertake cleanup activities, often at
considerable expense.83 Courts have wrestled with the constitutionality of Superfund UAOs,84 although such orders have largely been
upheld.85 Should an equivalent limit on the judicial review of ACOs
under the CWA pass constitutional muster?
What about Due Process?
The Supreme Court concluded that the Sacketts could seek preenforcement judicial review of the EPA’s ACO. This holding was
based on statutory grounds—specifically, the text of the CWA and
the presumption of reviewability of agency action under the APA.
As a consequence, it could be reversed by Congress, much as Congress has sought to preclude judicial review of administrative orders
under a handful of other statutes.86 Yet statutory preclusion of judicial review of ACOs would raise serious due process concerns.
The guarantee of due process of law is ‘‘by far the oldest of our
civil rights.’’87 Magna Carta guaranteed that ‘‘no free man’’ would
be ‘‘imprisoned or disseised or outlawed or exiled or in any way
ruined . . . except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the
law of the land.’’88 This principle required, at a minimum, that any
82

See, e.g., Nina Mendelson, SCOTUS Decision in Sackett v. EPA Weakens Government’s Ability to Respond to Urgent Threats to Water Quality, CPRBlog (Mar. 21,
2012, 5:50 PM), http://progressivereform.org/CPRBlog.cfm?fkScholar⳱36 (‘‘Congress should amend the Clean Water Act . . . to clarify, at least for urgent environmental
threats, that judicial review of a compliance order should have to wait.’’).
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See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h).
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See Frank B. Cross, Procedural Due Process under Superfund, 1986 BYU L. Rev.
919, 925–36 (1986) and cases cited therein; see also Cheryl Kessler Clark, Due Process
and the Environmental Lien: The Need for Legislative Reform, 20 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L.
Rev. 203 (1993).
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See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. Jackson 610 F.3d 110 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Employers Ins. of
Wausau v. Browner, 52 F.3d 656 (7th Cir. 1995); Solid State Circuit, Inc. v. EPA, 812
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deprivation of life, liberty, or property must be in accordance with
law. Thus, in order to conform with due process, executive action
must be duly authorized and judicial proceedings must observe
minimal procedural guarantees. As former Tenth Circuit Judge
Michael McConnell and Nathan Chapman note in a recent article,
‘‘Fundamentally, ‘due process’ meant that the government may not
interfere with established rights without legal authorization and
according to law.’’89
The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution likewise provides
that no person shall ‘‘be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law.’’90 When this amendment was adopted it was
well understood to mean that ‘‘the executive could not deprive
anyone of a right except as authorized by law, and that to be legitimate, a deprivation of rights had to be preceded by certain procedural protections, characteristic of judicial process.’’91 In the administrative context, this provision has meant that regulatory agencies
may adopt legislative-like rules—that is, regulations—only in accordance with the authority delegated to them by the legislature.92 When
adjudicating the particularized rights or obligations of individuals,
moreover, administrative agencies must engage in individualized
decision-making and observe additional procedural due process
guarantees—above all else, notice and the opportunity to be heard.93
89
Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Powers,
121 Yale L.J. 1672, 1679 (2012); see also Bernard H. Siegan, Property Rights: From
Magna Carta to the Fourteenth Amendment 16–17 (2001) (noting due process traditionally required, among other things, that the reason for a deprivation be found in
a ‘‘legitimately enacted law.’’).
90
This clause of the Fifth Amendment imposes due process obligations on the federal
government. Equivalent language in the Fourteenth Amendment imposes equivalent
obligations on state governments. See U.S. Const. amend XIV (‘‘nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law’’).
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See Chapman & McConnell, supra note 89, at 1679.
92
See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) (‘‘It is axiomatic
that an administrative agency’s power to promulgate legislative regulation is limited
to the authority delegated by Congress.’’); see also La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC,
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See Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908); see also Rubin, supra note 87, at 1051
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This guarantee is understood to require that the federal government
provide some degree of fair process before depriving someone of a
protected interest.
A threshold requirement for procedural due process is whether the
aggrieved individual has been deprived of a protected interest––life,
liberty, or property.94 The due process clause does not bar such
deprivations, however. It merely guarantees that the federal government will not deprive someone of such interests without providing
a minimum degree of process. If an individualized agency action
does not affect a deprivation of a protected interest, however, due
process concerns do not apply.
Being subject to a permitting system is not, in itself, a due process
violation.95 Ownership of land does not entitle the owner to be free
of any and all government regulation. Yet basic principles of due
process should entail that landowners not be subjected to costly
permitting requirements not duly authorized by the legislature. In
the case of wetlands, the existing regulations are of questionable
validity, the scope of the statute is unclear, and there is a history
of efforts to extend regulatory authority to the limits of federal
constitutional authority and beyond. This heightens the due process
concerns because the regulation of private land-use decisions beyond
that which is statutorily authorized (or constitutionally permitted)
is not ‘‘authorized by law.’’
In Sackett, both the federal government and environmentalist amici
contended that the ACO did not deprive the Sacketts of a cognizable
property interest. Although the ACO may have discouraged the
Sacketts from continuing to develop their land, the solicitor general
argued, it did not impose limitations on the use of their property
that were not derived from the CWA.96 Similarly, the environmentalist amici asserted that whether the Sacketts’ parcel was subject to
regulation under the CWA as ‘‘waters of the United States’’ was
independent of the ACO.97
94
See Amer. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 59 (1999) (‘‘The first inquiry
in every due process challenge is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a protected
interest in ‘liberty’ or ‘property.’’’).
95
See Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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Brief for the Respondents in Opposition at 45–46, Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367
(2011) (No. 10-1062), 2011 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 852.
97
Brief of Natural Resources Defense Council, et. al as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 30–31, Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2011) (No. 10-1062).
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Both the federal government and environmentalist amici construed
the affected interests too narrowly. The ACO, by its very terms and
the express language of the CWA, imposed legal obligations on the
Sacketts independent of the CWA itself.98 Had the ACO not been
issued, it has yet to be determined whether the Sacketts would
have been under any obligation to seek a permit from the Corps or
otherwise submit to regulation under the CWA. And even if the
Sacketts’ land is subject to federal regulation, the ACO altered their
rights and obligations. Whether or not the specific land restoration
requirements were necessitated by the CWA’s goals, these requirements—and, in particular, the original requirement to plant specific
types of trees in a particular way—were imposed on the Sacketts by
the EPA through the ACO.99 Further, the ACO ordered the Sacketts to
allow EPA officials access to the parcel and relevant records, which
arguably infringed upon the Sacketts’ constitutional right to exclude
others from their property, particularly since the ACO was not the
result of an individualized adjudication, let alone supported by probable cause.
The Supreme Court has recognized that an administrative action
need not, by itself, deprive a landowner of title or impose direct
financial consequences in order to amount to a cognizable deprivation for due process purposes. In Connecticut v. Doehr, for instance,
the Court explained that ‘‘even the temporary or partial impairments
to property rights that attachments, liens, and similar encumbrances
entail are sufficient to merit due process protection.’’100 On this basis,
lower courts have found that even nonpossessory attachments are
sufficient to trigger due process protections.101
Not only did the ACO double the Sacketts’ potential liability and
bar them from engaging in an otherwise lawful use of their property,
it also required them to undertake significant and potentially costly
remedial measures—and even ordered them to inform any prospective purchaser of the ACO before selling or otherwise transferring
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Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1371.
See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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501 U.S. 1, 12 (1991).
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their land.102 These requirements imposed substantial financial burdens and, like a lien or nonpossessory attachment, impaired their
ability to transfer their property. Justified or not, it is difficult to see
how the ACO did not affect a deprivation of a cognizable property interest.103
Establishing that the Sacketts were deprived of a cognizable property interest is only the first step in the analysis, however. Determining that they were entitled to due process does not determine the
degree of process they were due. At a minimum, Fifth Amendment
procedural due process guarantees notice and ‘‘the opportunity to
be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’’104
The degree of process due is heavily dependent on context.105 What
should be clear, however, is that the right to be heard cannot be
meaningful if the government is free to penalize it.106
Under Ex parte Young, it is impermissible for the government to
impose penalties ‘‘so enormous . . . as to intimidate’’ individuals
seeking judicial review, since ‘‘the result is the same as if the law
in terms prohibited’’ anyone from seeking judicial vindication of
their rights.107 The Supreme Court rejected an Ex parte Young claim
pressed by a mining company in Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich,108
but on grounds that are easily distinguished in that the statute at
102

Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits at 8, Sackett v. EPA., 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012) (No.
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issue provided far greater process than would have been available
under the EPA’s interpretation of the CWA. Thunder Basin Coal
had no claim that its activities were beyond the scope of the agency’s
regulatory authority and provided no evidence that pre-enforcement
compliance would impose a significant burden.109 Further, the statute
at issue provided for prompt administrative review of any citation
and complying with the regulatory requirements did not require
the company to forgo mounting a legal challenge to the rule.110 Thus,
the mine operator was not subject to the sort of ‘‘intolerable choice’’
anticipated in Ex parte Young.111
For the Sacketts, however, the EPA could declare them in violation
of the CWA on the thinnest evidence––thereby limiting their ability
to make normal use of their land––imposing restoration obligations
on them, and increasing their exposure to civil fines. The CWA,
as interpreted and enforced by the EPA, provides less procedural
protection than the statute at issue in Thunder Basin Coal. Further,
the penalties for violating an ACO can accumulate substantially. If
penalties of up to $75,000 per day assessed on small landowners do
not seem to reach the scale necessary to trigger Ex parte Young,
consider this: The EPA could delay bringing suit for as long as five
years, at which time the maximum penalty would near $70 million.
In many due process cases, the question is whether the complaining party is entitled to a hearing before the deprivation occurs. In
Sackett, however, all that was sought was a hearing after the ACO
was issued, but before it was enforced, and before the penalties had
time to mount. Allowing judicial review undoubtedly lessens the
attractiveness of ACOs for regulators, but that hardly makes the
insulation of such orders from judicial review constitutional.
The EPA feared that allowing pre-enforcement judicial review of
ACOs would undermine enforcement of the CWA. Yet judicial
review does not automatically stay enforcement of the order, so
allowing regulated entities their day in court does not necessarily
entail allowing them to continue to engage in allegedly polluting
behavior. It does, however, prevent agencies from using enforcement
leverage to force compliance with rules that may not even apply.
109

Id. at 217–18.
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In the Sacketts’ case, for instance, the fundamental question is
whether their land is subject to federal regulation in the first place.
Granting pre-enforcement review does not automatically entitle
them to continue building their house, but it does prevent the EPA
from piling on penalties before the jurisdictional question is
answered. The very reason ACOs are so favored by regulatory agencies is because they are a low-cost way for agencies to place tremendous pressure on parties to comply with agency goals.112 Warning
letters and informal communications are equally effective at alerting
landowners of their regulatory obligations, and may effectively discourage some potentially polluting behavior. What the EPA has not
shown is that the added force of the unreviewable ACO, with its
draconian sanctions, is necessary for effective enforcement of environmental regulations.
Lack of Notice
Notice is an essential element of due process. Among other things,
the principle requires that the laws be intelligible and indicate what
they require or forbid. As the Court noted in Connally v. General
Construction, a statute that defines obligations or prohibitions ‘‘in
terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first
essential of due process of law.’’113 A unanimous Court reaffirmed
this principle this term in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, stressing
the ‘‘fundamental principle’’ that ‘‘laws which regulate persons or
entities must give fair notice of conduct that is forbidden or
required.’’114 As Justice Kennedy wrote in Fox, ‘‘clarity in regulation
is essential to the protections provided by the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment.’’115 By this standard, federal wetlands regulations are wanting.
The concern for notice in the administrative context arises not
only in the First Amendment context. In General Electric v. EPA, for
example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit recognized
that the Due Process Clause ‘‘requires that parties receive fair notice
112
113
114
115

See Wynn, supra note 61, at 1896–97.
Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
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before being deprived of property.’’116 As the D.C. Circuit had held
before, due process of law ‘‘ ‘prevents . . .deference from validating
the application of a regulation that fails to give fair warning of the
conduct it prohibits or requires.’’117 Thus, the EPA and Army Corps
of Engineers may deserve deference in determining whether a given
parcel has a ‘‘significant nexus’’ to ‘‘waters of the United States,’’
but it would violate due process to impose civil or criminal liability
on a private party for failing to abide by the agencies’ conclusions
absent fair notice, such as would be provided by a clear regulatory
standard of the sort neither the EPA nor the Corps has seen fit to
promulgate.118
Many landowners do not have ‘‘fair notice’’ that their lands may
be subject to federal regulation under the CWA. The federal government has not clearly delineated the scope of federal regulatory jurisdiction under the CWA and CWA regulation extends far beyond
what many would consider to be ‘‘waters of the United States.’’ The
CWA is the source of substantial regulation of private land, yet the
CWA, by its terms, prohibits only the unpermitted discharge of
material into ‘‘waters of the United States.’’119 Only regulations promulgated by the EPA and Corps, not a statute, expressly extend federal
regulation to wetlands and other ‘‘waters.’’ But the extent to which
the agencies’ regulatory jurisdiction reaches such waters remains
unclear. As a consequence, ‘‘men of common intelligence’’ lack
notice that federal regulation of such ‘‘waters’’ may reach private
lots in the middle of residential subdivisions that are completely
dry much, if not most, of the year and lack any discernible nexus
to navigable waters.
Federal regulation of private land use remains the exception, not
the norm. Federal regulation of land use occurs only where such
regulation is necessary to further another purpose, such as species
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conservation or pollution control.120 A landowner may thus well
expect to find his or her land governed by a local zoning board
or other authority, but there is no general expectation of federal
involvement in local land use. Federal regulation of local land-use
is proscribed not only by statute, but by the Constitution as well.
Federal authority to regulate ‘‘commerce . . . among the several
states’’ hardly implies a power to regulate any and all lands that
may contain wetland features or other ecological values.121 Federal
courts have repeatedly admonished federal regulators to clarify the
necessarily limited scope of federal regulatory authority, but to no
avail.122 The regulations applied by the Corps and the EPA remain
those promulgated for more than 25 years, despite repeated challenges in which assertions of regulatory jurisdiction based on such
regulations have been rejected. For this reason, even a well-informed
landowner could be unclear as to how far federal regulatory jurisdiction extends.
Challenged as to how landowners in the Sacketts’ position could
be aware of a potential obligation to obtain a permit, the federal
government’s attorney did not have much of an answer, other than
to say that, in most cases, there would have been some prior communication between the EPA or Corps and the landowner alerting the
owner of the potential problem.123 At which point, he explained, the
landowner could apply for a permit. Yet whether a permit is necessary in the first place is precisely what is at issue. It hardly satisfies
the principles of due process to force landowners into a permitting
regime that may not even lawfully reach their lands. As Chief Justice
Roberts quipped at oral argument, the federal government’s position
seems to be: Since you didn’t ask us whether we could regulate
your property, ‘‘we can do it.’’124 After all, Roberts noted later, most
120
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landowners will not violate the order and risk the resulting accumulation of penalties just to get their day in court.
The federal government lacks authority to regulate every ecologically valuable property in the nation merely because it is ecologically
valuable. The heart of the Sacketts’ substantive claim is that their
land was beyond federal regulators’ reach. As Justice Antonin Scalia
noted for the Court, if the government is threatening to prosecute,
you may often go to court to seek a declaratory judgment to resolve
the question, rather than ‘‘wait for the prosecutor to . . . drop the
hammer.’’125 Yet here, where the government has done more than
merely threaten prosecution, no such pre-enforcement review is
available. Worse, refusing to comply with the government’s order
is itself a legal violation. It would be one thing to defend this sort
of system where time is of the essence—such as where prompt action
is necessary to prevent severe, ongoing contamination, as may result
from a hazardous waste spill.126 It is quite another to try to defend
it as ‘‘due process’’ when what is at issue is the deposit of clean fill
on a half-acre plot of land that may not even be within the scope
of federal regulatory jurisdiction in the first place.
Conclusion
Despite Sackett, there remains a due process deficit in environmental law, and in the federal regulation of wetlands in particular. The
EPA and Army Corps of Engineers exercise their regulatory power
without due regard for the limits on their own authority or the need
to provide private landowners with adequate notice of what federal
law may require of them. Efforts to challenge ACOs or their equivalent under other laws have been largely unsuccessful.
The reach and force of federal environmental statutes challenge
traditional conceptions of limited government power.127 Property
rights, in particular, are routinely compromised in the name of environmental protection that extends far beyond statutory bounds.
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Were that not bad enough, such incursions are often for naught, as
those regulatory programs least friendly to owners are often those
least effective at advancing environmental values. Imposing regulatory burdens on private landowners in the name of species conservation, for example, can actually undermine the conservation of endangered species.128 When those landowners who own potential species
habitat are burdened with land-use restrictions under the Endangered Species Act, they become less likely to cooperate with conservation efforts. At the extreme, landowners respond to the economic
incentives such regulatory schemes create and take preemptive
action to avoid regulatory constraints in the future—at the expense
of habitat for endangered species. At the same time, promising nonregulatory means of advancing environmental protection––means
that do not raise the same sorts of due process concerns—remain
largely ignored.129
For over a decade, this nation has struggled to reconcile the needs
of national security with constitutional guarantees. Progressives in
particular have recognized that we need not sacrifice fundamental
liberties in order to keep Americans safe from terrorist threats. It is
strange, then, that Progressives have been unable to reach the same
recognition in the context of environmental law.130 Recognizing the
constitutional rights of small landowners, some fear, risks granting
legal protections to potentially polluting corporations.131 Yet private
landowners and corporations accused of environmental wrongs are
no less worthy of due process protections than alleged terrorists. If
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it is possible to reconcile liberty and security, it should also be
possible to reconcile liberty with sustainability. The principles of
due process should not need to be sacrificed in either case.
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